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Most governments cannot provide the necessary health services required for their citizens either 
as a result of scarcity of resources or corruption (Mostert et al., 2012). Lack of credibility and trust 
in fund managers has been highlighted as one of the reasons why people do not join health 
insurance schemes in developing countries, especially in Africa (Escobar et al., 2010). This work 
investigates the impact of corruption on household’s willingness to participate and pay for health 
insurance in the presence of corruption. To do so, we use (1) a binary logit model to study the 
relationship between household characteristics and experienced corruption; (2) an ordered probit 
model to explore how household characteristics are associated to the intensity of corruption 
perceived; and (3) a Mixed Logit model to estimate the association of corruption and participation 
and willingness to pay for a health insurance scheme.  We find that corruption decreases the 
willingness to participate and pay for a public Health Insurance Scheme (HIS). Comparing 
experienced and perceived corruption, we observe that experienced corruption affects less WTP 
for a HIS than perceived corruption. Households experiencing corruption, are willing to pay more 
for a public HIS than those that perceive high levels of corruption. The implications of our findings 
are in line with the literature and stress the perverse spillover effects of corruption. Not only 
corruption hinders the effectiveness of health care systems and thus health outcomes, but it also 
undermines the willingness to pay for them and thus imperils the sustainability of health care 




One of the fundamental problems facing developing countries is the manner in which 
corruption has ravaged those countries (Mostert et al., 2012): it makes health care costly and 
unaffordable for most of the population; it has negative effect on patient care and morale of 
health care workers; and inefficient health systems with poor quality services, inequitable access 
and inadequate funding (Pieterse & Lodge (2015), Rispel et al (2016), Lewis (2007), TI (2006)). 
Corruption is often seen as a spill-over of government intervention that can negatively affect the 
provision of health care services (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Agbenorku, 2012).   
There are several definitions of corruption are used in the literature, namely: the abuse of office 
for personal gain (Klitgaard et al. 2000); the abuse of trust and the intentional violation of duty, 
motivated by gaining personal advantage, towards a party in need of a decision or service by a 
public servant (Alatas, 1986); and the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, in the form of 
bribery, extortion, manipulation of information in drug trials, overbilling, mis-procurement, 
diversion of medicines and supplies, and nepotism (TI, 2006).  
Considerable evidence supports the point that unofficial payments are deeply entrenched in 
markets for health care in developing and poor countries. Studies also show that corruption within 
the health sector contributes significantly to the poor health situation in developing countries. A 
study of 71 countries by the World Bank (1997) revealed that highly corrupt countries (i.e. with 
high corruption indices) have higher infant mortality rates, even after adjustments for income, 
female education, health expenditure and urbanization. Another study by the World Bank on child 
death caused by malaria in rural Tanzania concluded that 80% of these cases went to modern 
health facilities but, to a large extent, were not cured due to corrupt practices. In as much as the 
effect of corruption in the health sector is clear, however, the overall cost of corruption is difficult 
to determine because of numerous problems including the difficulty of distinguishing between 
corruption, inefficiency and honest mistakes; the paucity of good record keeping in many 
countries, and the range of stakeholders in this sector. All these make determining the cost of 
corruption in the health sector cumbersome. In developing countries, corruption is rife in the 
health sector because it is hatched in the uncertainty of demand, and spreads to various other 
sub-sectors within the health system, thereby affecting almost all health care participants and 
stakeholders and hence creating expectations of bribes.  
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Health officials engage in corruption for various reasons, but key amongst them as discussed by 
Vian (2007) are: (1) officials must have opportunities like monopoly of services, discretion to make 
decisions, poor accountability and transparency in order for them to engage in corruption; (2) a 
conducive environment wherein society believes you have to be corrupt before you can make it 
and the erosion of public service values to ensure corruption thrives well; and (3) low salaries, 
personal financial debt and similar pressures force public officials to engage in corruption. Lewis 
(2007) explained that in developing countries, medical staffs are involved in under-the-table 
corruption because of the low and irregular payment of their salaries; lack of government action 
in the health care system and the culture of giving gifts.  
Savedoff (2006) explains that the health sector is vulnerable to corruption because of the high 
uncertainty in health outcomes or demand for health services – issues like who will fall ill, when 
and what will they need. However, Olken and Pande (2011) argued that even though corruption 
is substantial in magnitude, it does not necessarily answer the question of whether it has a 
negative impact on economic activity. They further explain that the impact of corruption depends 
on whether the corrupt act can lead to an economic efficiency loss (or gain), which also depends 
on whether the deadweight loss from the bribes collected are greater (or smaller) than the 
equivalent deadweight loss from taxation needed to raise revenue to pay the equivalent amount 
of money in salaries were corruption eliminated.   
Sierra Leone is not an exception to this problem. Corruption is one of the most important factors 
to have retarded growth in the health sector. Corruption in Sierra Leone’s health sector ranges 
from demanding bribes for use of basic services to large-scale misuse of public goods for private 
gain by public officials (DfID, 2013). Along the Transparency International (TI) Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2017, Sierra Leone scored 30 out of 100 (where 0 is considered highly 
corrupt and 100 very clean) and ranked 130 out of 175 countries. A local survey by the Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC) in Sierra Leone (2010) shows that the majority of Sierra Leoneans 
have experienced corruption in one way or the other, with 94% classifying it as a problem. In 
March 2013, the ACC indicted 29 officials of the National Health Sector Support Project (NHSSP) 
at the Ministry of Health and Sanitation for various corruption offences regarding misuse of the 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) funds. The various charges amounted to 
$2,436,921.07.1 Pieterse & Lodge (2015) opine that corruption scandals have plagued the Free 
 
1 Culled from the ACC website www.anticorruption.gov.sl on 12/11/2013. 
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Health Care (FHC) initiative in Sierra Leone. In 2009, an Amnesty International report in Pieterse 
& Lodge (2015) found that, in most areas, staff, whether paid or unpaid, would unilaterally and 
illegally charge fees and keep the money, which created a health care system that was often too 
costly for many Sierra Leoneans to access.   
Studies (Rispel et al., 2016; Akokuwebe and Michael, 2017; Agbenorku 2012) agree that 
corruption within the health sector is serious and that something needs to be done urgently to 
solve it, or else the poor will continue to get poorer and their life expectancy shorter. However, 
before coming to this conclusion, it is important to assess the magnitude of the impact of 
corruption, which is the main contribution of this paper. The effect of corruption is likely to be 
large for poor people who cannot afford paying bribes or seeking private alternatives. The Public 
Affairs Centre (PAC) survey revealed that as much as 38% of total hospital expenses borne by 
households are in the form of bribes, and some 17% of households claim to have made unofficial 
payments to public hospitals (Paul, 1998 in Gupta et al., 2000).2 A study by Gray-Molina et al. 
(1999) also revealed that people’s perception of corruption in the health sector strongly 
correlates with input overpricing and unofficial payments.   
The focus of this paper is twofold: first, we study the relationship between corruption, both 
perceived and experienced, and household characteristics. Second, we assess the impact of 
corruption on household participation and willingness to pay for a HIS. This paper is structured as 
follows. The next section outlines the methodology used followed by the econometric 
specification before analyzing the results. We then present the results and finally discuss and 
conclude.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Study Area and Sampling 
This study is carried out in Sierra Leone, a country of about 7 million people living along 
the west coast of Africa. The study uses data from a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) conducted 
by the authors in the northern and western regions of Sierra Leone (see Kamara et al, 2018; and 
Jofre-Bonet and Kamara, 2018).3    
 
2 PAC is a local agency in Bangalore, India that conducts public service delivery surveys 
3 When purposively driven by a researcher’s prior knowledge and familiarity, the choice of study areas enhances the accuracy of the 
data and the econometric estimates obtained from it (Deaton and Paxson, 1997) 
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Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL) designed the sample needs and locations for this study based on a 
recent pre-census data that has information on settlement names, population and household 
sizes. A two-stage stratified random sampling method is used to identify the households. The first 
stage involves stratifying the population by region/district, and the second, by rural and urban 
location in each district. The purpose was to have a representative sample of informal sector 
households in both villages (rural areas) and major towns (urban areas). The choice of the 
household as the economic unit stems from the fact that the economic decision to purchase 
health care among these rural and mostly farming households is more likely to be a household 
rather than an individual decision.  
2.2. Data Collection for the Discrete Choice Experiment  
A Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) method was used to collect the data. The DCE is an 
attribute-based measure of benefit/value (Ryan and Gerard, 2003). This survey-based data 
collection method is used to establish preferences for a HIS characteristics and levels of provision 
by allowing households to choose to participate or not in different HIS described with different 
traits, including cost (see Kamara et. al, 2018, for a detailed analysis of the DCE process). This 
allows to establish trade-offs between traits and levels of attributes. 
The HIS attributes and their levels used in our DCE are below: 
Table 1: Attributes and Levels used in the DCE 





Primary Health Care Diseases and Minor Operations 
Secondary Health Care Diseases and Major Operations 





The length of time one has to wait before seeing medical 
personnel  






Health centres and hospitals owned and operated privately 
Health centres and hospitals owned and operated publicly 






The monthly premium members will pay for the scheme 
 
4 The exchange rate used right through this work is at November 2016; $1 = 7400SLL and SLL means Sierra Leone currency  
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An additional questionnaire was used to collect information on the socio-demographic 
characteristics of households. Households’ demographic characteristics were used to determine 
the relationship between corruption and household characteristics, their current health status 
and how they financed their health.   
2.3. Data Collection 
This study used an interviewer-administered questionnaire. Interviewers were recruited 
and trained on how to administer a DCE survey as described in Kamara et al. (2018). 
Eight predominant informal sector activities were chosen for the survey: Petty Trading, 
Subsistence Farming, Commercial Bike Riding (Okada), Cattle Rearing, Fishing, Tailoring, Mining, 
and Quarrying. A total of 1,670 households took part in the initial survey. Due to failure to pass 
the dominance test and incomplete data during administration of the questionnaire, 1,458 
households’ data were used for the final analysis, which provided 39,366 observations for the 
analysis of nine choice sets with three alternatives. 
2.4. Variables  
Our survey has two measures of corruption: First, perceived corruption within the health 
sector on a scale of 1 (not corrupt) to 4 (highly corrupt), labeled as perccorr. Second, whether 
households have paid for treatments that should be free according to the Free Health Care (FHC) 
treatment Act (2010) for children under five years old, pregnant women and lactating mothers at 
public hospitals or health centres. We created a variable labeled fhccorr which takes value 1 if 
households say they paid for treatments and services supposed to be free and 0 otherwise. In the 
literature, paying for treatments that should be free is an indicator of actual corruption in the 
health care system (Olken, 2009). The reasons given by households in our sample on why they 
pay for treatments that should have been free were: being unaware that these services were free; 
the medical personnel requested the payment; they paid willingly; and other, less important, 
reasons.  
Note, for the interpretation of our results, that these measures of corruption are at the household 
level, reflecting whether a household perceives (measure 1) or is subject to corruption (measure 
2) in the health sector. It is not an attribute of a (un)chosen provider. 
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Other household characteristics are Income Per Capita (IPC); economic activity of the head (Petty 
Trading; Subsistence Farming; Okada; Cattle Rearing; Fishing; Tailoring; Mining; Quarrying); years 
of school of head; Distance to a Health Care Centre; age of the head; health shock; size; diseases 
experienced; location (rural or urban); receives remittances from abroad; the head listens to the 
radio and reads newspapers regularly as described in Table 2.  
Additionally, as explained in Kamara et al. (2018), the dataset includes indicator variables 
reflecting the attributes of the health scheme being presented to the households in terms of cost, 
coverage, waiting time, choice of provider and their different levels as specified in Table 1. The 
choice of attributes varies with each health insurance alternative faced in the survey whereas the 
household’s characteristics do not vary across the scenarios and would drop from a standard DCE 
estimation.  
 
In order to capture how corruption affects household preferences over HIS attributes, we create 
two interaction terms using the corruption indicators and one key attribute presented, the HIS 
being provided publicly. This enables slope coefficients to differ between subgroups while 
preserving the variability in the attribute – level distribution (Hensher et al, 2005). The interaction 
variables are fhccorrpublic and perccorrpublic. Table 2 below presents the variables used in the 
analysis and their definitions. 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions5 
Variable Definition 
Participation Reported household’s decision to participate in HIS; = 1 when answered Yes to participation and 0 otherwise. 
FHC Corruption (fhcorr) 
When the household reports that they pay medical expenses for a member in any of these 
categories: under-fives, pregnant women, and lactating mothers; = 1 when answered Yes and 0 
otherwise. 
Corruption Perception (perccorr) The household’s perception of corruption in the health sector (1) Not corrupt (2) Fairly corrupt (3) Corrupt (4) Very corrupt.  
Cost Amount to be paid for the HIS: 4,000, 6,000 & 10,000 SLL. 
Coverage1  Coverage of the scheme: Simple, Moderate & Comprehensive.  
Waiting Time Waiting time to see a doctor/nurse: 45, 60 and 90 minutes. 
Public Provider Public Provider = 1 when visited and 0 otherwise.   
Faith-Based - Provider Faith Based Provider = 1 when visited and 0 otherwise.   
Household Per Capita Income (PCI) Calculated household per capita income in Sierra Leonean Leones (SLL) derived by dividing household income by household size. 
Petty Trading Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Subsistence Farming Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Okada Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Cattle Rearing Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Fishing Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Tailoring Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Mining Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Quarrying Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 
School Reported whether household went to school = 1; 0 otherwise. 
 
5Moderate coverage is used as the definition of coverage in this work. 
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Distance to HC Distance in miles from village to nearest health centre. 
Age of Household Head Age of head of household. 
Shock Reported shock to household’s main informal economic activity = 1; 0 otherwise. 
Household Size Number of members in the household at the time of the interview. 
Diseases Whether any household member has suffered from malaria or typhoid fever in the three months prior to interview; yes = 1; 0 otherwise 
Location Household location: rural or urban; Urban = 1, Rural = 0. 
Remittance Whether household receives remittance from abroad; Yes = 1, 0 otherwise 
News Whether household head listens to radio or read newspapers; Yes = 1; 0 otherwise 
Interactions:   
fhcorrpublic Interaction term of the impact of FHC corruption on participation in a HIS that provides services through a public choice of provider; Yes = 1; 0 otherwise. 
perccorrpublic Interaction term of the impact of households’ perception of corruption on participation in a HIS that provides services through a public choice of provider; Yes = 1; 0 otherwise 
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3. Econometric Estimation Strategy 
We estimate three different models: The first two models estimate how household 
characteristics are associated with the likelihood of the household perceiving corruption (perccorr is 
the dependent variable); and with the household having experienced actual corruption (fhcorr), i.e. 
households paying for treatments that should be free. The third model examines how corruption 
influences the choice of the type of HIS. 
Since fhccorr is a binary variable (yes or no) and percorr  is an ordered categorical variable with 4 levels, 
we apply a logit model to estimate the model that has fhcorr as dependent variable and an Ordered 
Probit model for the perccorr model.  
To estimate how corruption influences the choice of the type of HIS, we use a DCE relying on the DCE 
literature summarized by Ryan and Gerard (2003). Given the attributes of the HIS and the levels of 
their service/characteristics, the estimation is based on drawing independent samples of potential HIS 
scenarios from the full factorial set (as explained in Kamara et al., 2018). To estimate the model DES, 
one relies on the idea that individuals decide based on the comparison of the indirect utility functions 
associated to the different HIS choices. The individual will chose HIS A with indirect utility 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  if this utility is higher than that of HIS B (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ). The indirect utility 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the 
measurable component of HIS j and can be estimated while the error term cannot be observed. 
Nevertheless, we know that if the individual chooses HIS A over B, then (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) >
(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) , which gives a probability model to be estimated:𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃((𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) < (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )).  
The linearized utility function that defines household i’s participation in the HIS j is given in the 
equation below:  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1i𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2i𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3i𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4i𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5i𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (1)    
       
where β0 is the intercept and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are attributes of HIS j.  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
is cost of scheme; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 takes value 1 when HIS j provides moderate coverage; 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶 is waiting time 
associated with HIS j; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 takes value 1 if HIS j is offered by a public provider; and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 takes value 1 
if HIS j belongs to a faith-based provider. We interact the two variables of corruption (actual and 
perceived) and choice of public provider, 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , as previous work highlighted that households 
were willing to pay less for public provider hospitals or clinics due to their high level of corruption 
(Kamara et. al 2018). The error term ŋ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 captures the unobserved correlation between HIS alternatives 
for household i, and, finally, εi∴ is an iid error term. We estimate discrete choice models using Mixed 
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Logit Models (MXL).6  
In a DCE model, coefficients indicate the relative importance of each attribute. The sign of a coefficient 
reflects whether the attribute has a positive or negative effect on utility. The trade-offs that 
respondents are willing to make between attributes can be estimated by the ratios of the coefficients 
(Ryan et al., 2003). For instance, the ratio of the coefficients of coverage versus public provider, 
Cov/Pub, represents an estimate of how coverage the respondent is willing to accept or be willing to 
forsake in order to have a public provider as opposed to another type. The value of the coefficient of 
Cost is used to estimate the WTP for another attribute. For example, the WTP to avoid a longer wait 
can be obtained by dividing the coefficients of waiting and the negative of that corresponding to its 
cost, i.e. Wait/-Cost, as the coefficient of Cost represents the importance of a change in cost. As 
explained, one can also introduce interaction terms in the regression model to assess whether a 
combination of attributes subtracts or adds to the WTP for a HIS’ particular attribute. 
4. RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the analysis in the form of descriptive statistics, estimates 
of the effect of household characteristics on the likelihood of actual and perceived corruption, and of 
scheme characteristics on the likelihood of participation in given schemes.  
4.1. Data Summary and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 below presents descriptive statistics of the socio-demographic characteristics of 
households to experienced corruption, fhcorr, and to the level of perceived corruption, perccor, in the 
health sector.  
As shown in Table 3, about two thirds of the households sampled are engaged in the economic activity 
of Petty Trading, Subsistence Farming, or Okada Riding. Over 70 percent of households prefer going 
to the health centre or hospital for treatment whenever sick. About 96% of households responded 
they paid for FHC services even though they were meant to be free. From the households sampled, 
when asked why they paid for FHC that was free, 52% responded they were asked to pay, 38% 
responded they were unaware they should not pay while another 6% responded they paid willingly.  
About 44 percent of those who paid for FHC and of those who perceived high levels of corruption in 
the health sector live in urban areas. Six out of ten households that paid for FHC services and perceived 
high corruption had been to school.  
 
 








Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Description Main Sample Yes FHC 
Corruption 
Perceived High 
















































































































































4.2. Relationship between corruption and household characteristics 
This section studies the relationship between actual corruption (fhcorr) and household 
characteristics. We use logit models as households respond ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the question on whether 













Table 4: Experienced corruption and household socio-economic characteristics – Logit Model 
Dependent variable: FHC1 Corruption (fhcorr) 

































































































No of Observation 
No of households 
Wald Chi2 (15) 















1. FHC stands for Free Health Care Corruption. 2. The reference sector is quarrying. 3. No School is the base.  
4. Rural is the reference location used. Significance levels indicated by stars: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
All variables in Table 4 apart from the economic activity of Fishing are statistically significant. 
Thus, the probability of a household paying health services that should have been free is significantly 
and positively correlated to whether the household is receiving remittances, suffering from diseases 
(malaria or typhoid), living in an urban area, and the household head listening to news. On the other 
hand, there is a negative correlation with distance to the Health Centre, school, and the age of the 
household head.  
Table 4 above also presents the odds ratio and relative risk analysis of the relationship between actual 
corruption and households’ characteristics. The odds for answering yes to fhcorr is about 1.6, 1.8 and 
1.9 times more likely for households whose primary economic activity is either Tailoring, Subsistence 
Farming, or Cattle Rearing respectively, than those whose economic activity is not among these, i.e. 
households involved in these three sectors are more likely to have paid for services considered to be 
free. The household living in an urban location and whether the household head receives remittances 
do not finally change the odd ratio, i.e. their odds’ ratios are close to 1. 
4.3. Perceived corruption and household characteristics 
Households were also asked to choose from a scale of 1 to 4 (not corrupt to highly corrupt) 
how they perceive corruption in the health sector. Using an Ordered Probit model we study the 
relationship between households’ perception of corruption in the health sector and their socio-
demographic factors. As each household had four options to choose from in a sequential order from 
low to high, the use of the Ordered Probit model is justified.  
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of a change in household’s perception of corruption as a result 
of a change in our independent variables, and their standard errors.  
Table 5: Perceived corruption and household characteristics - Ordered Probit 
Dependent 
Variable: Household Corruption perception (percorr) 
Levels: Not Corrupt Less Corrupt Corrupt Highly Corrupt 
















-.0525049    
(.0050194) *** 
-.0082131    
(.0040254) * 
-.008552    
.0004883    
(.0007412) 
.0012384   
(.0006009) * 
.0012794    
.0906106    
(.0086617) *** 
.0141735    
(.0069424) ** 


















.1082481   
(.0100751) *** 
(.0069052) *** 
-.0859871    
(.0061474) *** 
-.0579447    
(.0054485) *** 
-.0053006    
(.0077632) 
.0715158    
(.0043637)*** 
(.0009047) 
-.0075644    
(.0019096) *** 
-.000396    
(.0009889) 
.0008536    
(.0011438) 
-.042249    
(.0047826)*** 
(.0118986) 
.1499487    
(.0108448) *** 
.1001155    
(.0094416) *** 
.009154    
(.0133923) 






























 (9.10e-09) *** 
-.0327223   
(.0028734) *** 
.061009    
(.0037199) *** 
.0134857    
(.0006037*** 
-.0763381    
(.0033112) *** 
.0279808    
(.0035922) *** 
-.0008085    
(.0001393) *** 
-.0457633    
(.0034074) *** 




-.0022392    
(.0005898) *** 
-.000495    
(.0001284) *** 
.0096378    
(.0010212) *** 
-.0011536      
(.00031) *** 
.0000297    
(9.13e-06) *** 
.0016796    
(.0004483) *** 
2.41e-09    
(7.62e-10) *** 
.0015886     
(.000432) *** 
-.1048934    
(.0062495) *** 
-.023186     
(.000997) *** 
.1326466    
(.0056162) *** 
-.0481517    
(.0061599) *** 
.00139     
(.000239) *** 
.0786813    
(.0057622) *** 
1.13e-07    
(2.07e-08) *** 












1.The reference sector is Petty Trading. 2. No school is the base. 3. Rural is used as the reference location  
Significant levels indicated by stars: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.  
 
Household’s IPC, distance to the health centre, and living in an urban location positively influence the 
household’s perception that health care is not or not much corrupt (first two columns). And these 
variables have a negative effect on perceiving the health care system as quite corrupt or very corrupt 
(columns 3 and 4). Schooling, age of household head, diseases, receiving remittances and the head 
listening to news decrease the likelihood of perceiving no or low levels of corruption and increase that 
of perceiving high levels of corruption.  
Looking at the coefficients in detail, the probability of reporting the health sector as not corrupt and 
little corrupt is positive for all informal economic activities compared to Petty Trading, but not for 
Fishing, the only sector positively associated with perceiving no or low corruption and negatively 
associated with quite or high corruption levels. For all others, it is the other way around.  
Distance to a Health Care Centre significantly influences household’s perception of corruption. Each 
additional kilometer to the nearest Health Care Centre is associated to an increase of 1.02 percentage 
points in the likelihood to class the health system as not corrupt and it decreases the likelihood of 
perceiving as highly corrupted by 2.31 percentage points. 
For households in which heads went to school, one additional year of schooling significantly decreases 
the household’s likelihood of perceiving no corruption in 6.6 percentage points and increases the 
likelihood of perceiving it as very corrupt in 13.2 percentage points. Households where the head reads 
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a newspaper have a similar association to perceived corruption to that of schooling. In sum, education 
and reading newspapers are associated to a more pessimistic perception of the health care system, 
i.e. more likely to be corrupted. 
In addition, having suffered from malaria or typhoid fever is associated with an increase of 7.9 
percentage points of the likelihood of perceiving the health sector as highly corrupt, and 
correspondingly, it is negatively associated to perceiving it as no or lowly corrupted. 
The result also shows that household’s income per capita (IPC) is positively associated to the 
household perceiving the health sector as not corrupt. An extra 10 percent increase in the households’ 
IPC is associated with an increase of 4.6 percentage points in the likelihood of perceiving health care 
as not corrupt and 10.5 percentage points less likely to perceived it as very corrupt.     
4.4. Corruption and households’ participation in health insurance      
We now turn to studying the association between corruption and households’ participation in 
a HIS by using Mixed Logit models7 (MXL) to estimate equation (1). Data were collected on the HIS 
attributes (coverage, cost, waiting time and choice of provider), corruption and participation in HIS. 
The study makes use of 500 Halton draws for each sampled household to generate their simulated 
probability.8   
Table 6 below presents the estimation results of the MXL model for the main sample. The mean 
coefficients of the estimates are presented alongside their standard deviations.  
The attributes of HIS have the expected effects. The attribute Cost has a negative sign, implying that 
the probability of participating in a HIS goes down as cost rises. Coverage and faith-based provider are 
significantly and positively associated to the likelihood that the household will participate in the HIS. 
There is a strong preference in Sierra Leone for faith - based providers based on the observation that 
providers are reliable as they have very good doctors.  There is also a positive significant effect on 
participating in a HIS if the provider is public. 
As explained, in order to understand how perceived or experienced corruption of a health care 
provider impacts the household’s likelihood participation in a HIS, we interact the measures of 
perceived and actual corruption with the HIS being provided by a public provider.  
Table 6: The Impact of Corruption on Households’ Participation in Health Insurance –  
Mixed Logit Model Result 
 Participation in Health Insurance  
FHC Corruption 
Participation in Health Insurance  
Perceived Corruption  












7 For better explanation of the MXL model see McFadden & Train (2000) and Hole (2013).  
8 This work used 500 Halton draws because it is the most widely used number of draws and, as Train (2000 & 1998) explains, a large 










































































No of Observation 
No of households 
LR Chi2 (k-1) 








                 1458   
                 2375.98 
0.0000 
-9761.4837 
Notes: SE stands for Standard Error. SD stands for Standard Deviation.  
*** Significant at 99% confidence level; ** Significant at 95%; and * Significant at 90%. 
 
Using Table 6, we can compare the impact of experienced and perceived corruption on participation 
in a HIS publicly provided. The negative coefficients of both interaction terms fhcorrpub and 
percorrpub indicate that households having experienced or perceived corruption are less likely to 
participate in a publicly provided HIS as compared to households that have not experienced or 
perceived corruption. The coefficient of fhcorrpub has a large negative and significant effect on the 
participation in health insurance by public providers but the coefficient of percorrpub is not 
statistically significant. Otherwise, the two models show similar results in that all other variables are 
statistically significant and most coefficients exhibit substantial preference heterogeneity as shown by 
their statistically significant standard deviations. In particular, the results indicate that, on average, 
the likelihood of households participating in a HIS is higher when the cost of the scheme and waiting 
time are low.  
4.5. Willingness to Pay to Participate in Health Insurance 
The impact of corruption on a households’ participation in health insurance can also be 
interpreted in terms of households’ WTP to participate in a publicly provided HIS if there is experience 
or perception of corruption. As explained in section 3, we can use the coefficient of Cost to calculate 
the WTP for any other attribute by dividing the coefficient of interest by the negative of the cost 
coefficient (Ryan et al, 2003, for a summary). Thus, in this case, the estimated WTP to participate in a 
publicly provided HIS is SLL 3,758 (i.e., 0.07325/0.00003) as per the coefficients of Public Provider and 
Cost in first model, and SLL 2,441 (i.e., 0.11276/0.00003) as per the corresponding coefficients in the 
second one. Also, we can calculate the detriment in the WTP for a publicly provided HIS when the 
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household has experienced (SLL -978.00) or perceived (SLL - 684.67) corruption.  
We can conclude that, although the WTP to pay for a publicly provided HIS is positive according to our 
estimates, having experienced or perceiving corruption in the health care system makes households 
WTP considerably less than a situation without corruption. 
   Table 7 WTP1 for a publicly provided HIS in the presence of corruption 
  Public HIS Interaction public HIS and corruption 
Total WTP for public HIS if 
corruption present 
Model 1 - experienced corruption 3,758 -978 2,780 
Model 2 - perceived corruption 2,441 -684.67 1,756 
Notes: The WTP figures are in the local currency - Sierra Leonean Leones (SLL).  
1WTP to participate in a publicly provided HIS for a reduction in corruption. 
 
Table 7 also shows that the WTP in a publicly provided HIS is about 63% higher (1,756/2,780) when 
the household has experienced corruption than when corruption is perceived.  This is in line with the 
literature showing that respondents are WTP more for HIS in response to having experienced 
corruption than just perceiving it (Chetwynd et al. 2003; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Kenny 2006).    
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper studies the relationship between household characteristics and having experienced 
and perceiving corruption using Logit and Ordered Probit models. Further, we analyse the association 
between household’s experienced and perceived corruption and the likelihood to participate in a HIS 
and the detriment on the WTP for a publicly provided HIS that these two measures of corruption have.  
Our findings indicate that the probability of a household having paid for health services that should 
have been free (experienced corruption) is significantly and positively correlated with the household 
receiving remittances; suffering from certain diseases (malaria or typhoid); living in an urban area, and 
the household head listening to the news. Distance to the Health Centre, the household head having 
attended school, and the age of the head are negatively associated with having experienced 
corruption. 
In terms of perceived corruption, there is a positive association between almost all informal economic 
activities sectors (except for Fishing) as compared to Petty Trading and perceiving high corruption in 
the health sector.  Household’s income per capita, distance to health centre and urban location are 
negatively associated to perceiving high corruption in the health care sector. On the other hand, 
household’s income per capita appears to make less likely to perceive corruption.  
We also learn that households prefer to participate in HIS and that, in particular, participation in a HIS 
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becomes more likely with better coverage and when the provider is faith-based, but becomes less 
likely with higher cost and waiting time.   
Our results also point out that having experienced or perceiving corruption in the health care system 
makes it less likely to participate in a publicly provided HIS. Moreover, we find that experienced 
corruption has stronger impact than perception on the likelihood to participate in a HIS, which the 
literature had already pointed out. Further, Olken (2009) raises the question of how individuals form 
their perceptions and, thus, how accurate reported perceptions actually are.  
Even further, our findings clearly show the detrimental spill-over costs of corruption in the health care 
system in countries such as Sierra Leone. Not only corruption may make a health care system 
inefficient and even wasteful but it also seems to undermine the public’s trust in the institutions: the 
WTP of households to participate in a publicly provided HIS declines when households have perceived 
or experienced corruption. 
These conclusions have strong implications as efforts to create HIS that can bring health care services, 
essential medicines, and medical equipment to those who need it will be not fully supported by the 
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